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研发投入跳跃与企业绩效——可用冗余和潜在冗余的调节效应

  • 李海东 ,
  • 戎晓婕
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  • 中国科学技术大学 管理学院, 安徽 合肥 230026
李海东(1964-),女,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为财务管理与企业创新;戎晓婕(1993-),女,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为财务管理与企业创新。

收稿日期: 2019-05-13

  网络出版日期: 2020-01-16

基金资助

安徽省自然科学基金项目(1708085MG174);安徽省高等教育振兴计划项目(2015zdjy003)。

R&D Spending Leap and Firm Performance—Moderating Effect of Available Slack and Potential Slack

  • LI Hai-dong ,
  • RONG Xiao-jie
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  • School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, Anhui, China

Received date: 2019-05-13

  Online published: 2020-01-16

摘要

基于间断平衡理论和组织冗余视角,以725家中国A股上市公司2007—2016年面板数据为样本,并按照企业规模、所有权集中度、成熟度、所有权性质等进行分类,系统分析了研发投入跳跃对企业绩效的影响以及可用冗余、潜在冗余对两者关系的调节效应。研究表明,研发投入跳跃对企业绩效的影响呈倒U形,即起初研发投入跳跃促进企业绩效,但是当跳跃超过一定幅度后,影响由正向变为负向。可用冗余负向调节研发投入跳跃与企业绩效之间的正向关系。相比于大型、所有权集中、成熟、国有企业,小型、所有权分散、年轻、非国有企业中,可用冗余对研发投入跳跃与企业绩效之间关系的负向调节更加显著;潜在冗余对研发投入跳跃与企业绩效之间关系的正向调节更加显著。

本文引用格式

李海东 , 戎晓婕 . 研发投入跳跃与企业绩效——可用冗余和潜在冗余的调节效应[J]. 华南理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2020 , 22(1) : 58 -71 . DOI: 10.19366/j.cnki.1009-055X.2020.01.006

Abstract

From the perspective of punctuated equilibrium and organizational slack, taking the panel data of 725 Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016 as a sample, and classifying the sample by scale, ownership concentration, maturity, ownership type, the impact of R&D spending leap on firm performance and the moderating effect of available slack and potential slack on the relationship between the two are analyzed. Research shows that R&D spending leap has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. R&D spending leap is beneficial to improve firm performance, but when the leap is beyond a certain range, it will bring negative effects to the firm. Compared to large, proprietary-concentrated, mature, and state-owned enterprises, in small, proprietary-dispersed, young, or non-state-owned firms, the relationship between R&D spending leap and firm performance is more significantly negatively moderated by available slack, and positively moderated by potential slack.

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